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Sustainable Decision Model for Liner Shipping Industry  
 
Abstract. International trade growth is facilitated by the container liner industry; however, 
liner shipping companies encounter operational challenges caused by the supply–demand 
mismatch of ship capacity, and competition between carriers and shippers in negotiating 
freight rates. Such concerns are resolved in liner shipping conferences; however, the 
European Commission has banned this practice because of its monopolistic characteristics, 
thus presenting the need for the liner shipping industry to control capacity and freight rates by 
adopting an independent information exchange system. Hence, we design a multi agent 
system technology for the primary and secondary markets, an iterative combinatorial auction 
mechanism applying Vickrey–Clarke–Groves payments to allocate slots economically 
efficient at flexible prices, and to maximise the profits of shipping companies considering 
ship routing and deployment plans. The complete enumerative solution methodology with 
binary sets and combinations representation with logical search for the multi agent system 
model was developed using Microsoft Visual C++, and also the mathematical model for the 
prevailing practices in liner shipping industry was developed and solved using the CPLEX 
12.5 solver in AIMMS software. A comparison of the results showed that the Multi agent 
system is effective in making sustainable decisions by sharing the cost and benefits than 
prevailing practices in liner industry. 
Keywords: Liner ship fleet deployment, liner ship routing, slot pricing, slot allocation, multi 
agent system (MAS), iterative combinatorial auction (ICA) 
 
 1. Introduction 
In container shipping, carriers achieve efficiency gains by supplying ships to increase the 
volume of trade through an appropriate fleet mix and reduced operating costs, whereas 
shippers and alliance members demand ship slots (capacity) with frequent shipping services 
between ports at low freight rates(Lun et al., 2010). However, the freight rate determined in 
liner conferences between shippers and liner shipping companies is considered 
anticompetitive in Europe, US and Asian countries. Also the decentralized liner shipping 
market is dynamic due to supply-demand mismatch of ship slots; complex in making socially 
and economically sustainable decision on alliance formation, resource allocation, cost and 
benefits sharing, and on improving the service quality of shared slots. This situation requires 
liner shipping companies to control capacity and freight rate by using an information 
exchange system (IES), monitored by an independent third party, to compete in the shipping 
market. Ting and Tzeng(2004) proposed a revenue management system for liner shipping 
companies, but that system demanded an integrated pricing, a database, and a dynamic slot 
control with an effective decision support system to improve revenue and manage the trade 
imbalances in operations. But the development in agent technology, the design of sustainable 
agent models in international trade, container distribution and inland distribution by Sinha-
Ray et al. (2003), provides scope for generating revenue by implementing a multi-agent 
system (MAS). Hence the market players such as shipping lines, carriers, and shippers in 
liner shipping logistics system are designed as agents to react in complex and dynamic 
maritime environment. 
However, the MAS encounters implementation and computational problems in providing 
effective cooperation and communication, and a mechanism is required to test and implement 
 
the system in the real world. The design of demand responsive transportation system as a 
multi-agent system and solving the resource complementariness and substitutability using a 
combinatorial auction mechanism by Satuni and Babki (2014) provides scope to apply 
auction mechanism. Harsha et al. (2010) contributed by designing strong activity rules to 
suppress the strategic behaviour of bidders in designing iterative combinatorial auctions to 
promote simple, continual, meaningful bidding and thus, price discovery. Andersson et al., 
(1999) compares the development in recent algorithms on winner determination problem 
(WDP) and presents the challenges in finding the computationally tractable algorithms to 
complex real-world instances.	 Also Mishra (2011) reported that iterative combinatorial 
auction (ICA) mechanism with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments has the 
characteristics of price discovery, computational ease in winner determination, incentive 
compatibility, and information privacy among bidders. Hence, it is chosen to allocate a 
bundle of slots to buyers in an economically efficient manner and the complete enumerative 
logical search algorithm for WDP to implement ICA with VCG is developed using Microsoft 
Visual C++ to automate MAS for agile decision making in maritime environment.  
Thus, the paper design a MAS with an ICA mechanism to allocate resources economically 
efficient, at prices determined in the primary market between shippers and liner shipping 
companies, and in secondary market among the liner shipping companies. The major 
contribution in the enumerative methodology part is the usage of logical search represented in 
binary form (0,1) of sets and its combinations to determine winners with maximum auction 
value and non-repetition of set allocation instead of weighted set packing and branch and 
bound search algorithms. The profit earned by the shipping lines(agents), and the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves(VCG) payments earned by the shippers(agents) through slot allocation, and 
the ship with its route for one complete port rotation were determined. In practice, exchange 
 
of slots among alliance members is based on the trust, contract and mutual understanding 
between the partners; hence the primary markets was mathematically modelled excluding the 
secondary market and solved using the CPLEX 12.5 solver in AIMMS software to compare 
with MAS model.	
The next section presents a literature review followed by a description and definition of 
problem in the liner shipping industry. The prevailing and proposed methodologies for 
solving the slot allocation, capacity management, and route planning problems are then 
explained and illustrated. Subsequently, the results obtained from the methodologies are 
discussed, and the conclusion and future research directions are presented in the final section. 
2. Literature review 
The status of research in areas such as fleet deployment planning, scheduling, routing, slot 
allocation, slot pricing, MAS and auction mechanisms is presented in this section to indicate 
the need for a suitable collaborative optimisation model to function in the complex and 
dynamic maritime environment. 
The joint routing and fleet deployment problem identified and solved by Alvarez (2009);the 
relationship between slow steaming and environmental benefits examined by Psaraftis et al. 
(2010);and the advantages of minimising fuel emissions by applying appropriate vessel 
scheduling reported by Qi and Song (2012) revealed fleet management problems, with the 
demand for alternative models and approaches for obtaining economic and environmental 
benefits. Furthermore, the design of a liner shipping network by considering slot profit, 
fluctuation in the demand for slots, and freight rates reported by Chen and Zeng (2010); and 
the liner shipping revenue management system to maximise freight contribution through slot 
allocation reported by Ting and Tseng (2004) reveals the need for a solution to slot allocation 
 
and pricing problem. In addition, Kaoy and Yen (1994) proposed an effective allocation of 
slots at profitable prices through various forms of alliance, and emphasized further studies to 
understand its effect on competition. Lu et al. (2010a, 2010b) proposed a mathematical model 
to determine the slot allocation, and slot sharing among alliance members, with a demand in 
designing a model to assist cooperation and competition between partners. Thus, from the 
literature on fleet and revenue management, routing, scheduling, slot allocation, and pricing 
the need for a cooperative system to encourage competition between market players is 
acquired.  
However, the solution to the vessel scheduling and berthing problem in container terminals 
through the use of the belief, desire, and intention based agent model reported by Lokuge and 
Alahakoon (2007); and the application of MAS approaches in container terminal planning 
and management problems reported by Henesey et al. (2003); the state of art illustrated on the 
application of agent based models as optimisation technique to complex and distributed 
systems by Barbati et al. (2012) provides scope for developing a cooperative MAS. It also 
emphasize to focus on the negotiation mechanism, information handling and validation 
system, for successful MAS implementation. The computational difficulty in multi-agent 
system due to coalition formation was presented and a parallel algorithm was proposed by 
Tombus and Bilgic (2004). However the overview of various auctions and their mechanism 
design along, with computational challenges in solving strategic and implementation 
complexities reported by Kalagnanam (2004); and the design of iBundle Extend and Adjust, 
an ascending price combinatorial auction with strategy proof and limited information 
disclosure from agents, reported by Parkes (2001), the development of different heuristics to 
solve WDP for multi-agent resource allocation by Kevin (2003), shows the development and 
suitability of auction mechanisms to MAS. In addition, Mishra (2007) stated that, by 
 
providing discounts from the competitive price to the ascending price Iterative ICA, VCG 
payment to bidders can be obtained and the incentive compatible problem among bidders can 
be solved..  Mishra (2011) also described a particular ICA that implements the VCG 
mechanism.  
Based on the development of auction mechanisms, the option of ICA is found suitable for 
resolving the computational, implementation, and incentive compatibility problems of agents 
at auction and successfully implement MAS to liner shipping market. The description of the 
problem is presented in the subsequent section. 
3. Problem formulation 
This section addresses the objective criterion, liner ship fleet planning scenario, definition of 
the problem, slot allocation mathematical model, and MAS model along with its assumptions. 
3.1 Objective criterion 
 The objective of this study is to simulate the design of a ship fleet deployment plan, and its 
itinerary to maximise the profit of shipping lines or carrier agents through sustainable slot 
allocation and pricing in primary and secondary markets. This simulation also avoids the 
presence of excess capacity due to non cooperative contracts among shippers and shipping 
lines in trade market. The paper compares two solution methodologies to achieve these 
objectives: (1) the formulation of a mathematical model to the prevailing practices on slot 
allocation among shipping agents, with freight rates determined in liner conference and (2) 
the formation of an MAS model with efficient ICA algorithm to determine the slot allocation 
in primary and secondary markets among agents, at prices determined in ICA. 
 
3.2 Liner ship fleet planning environment 
 
The maritime trade environment on slot allocation and pricing are explained as follows, A set 
of owned or chartered ships, S, are used by shipping companies to transport containers 
between set of M possible port pairs representing the origin and destination along an assumed 
cyclic route R, and covering set of ports P. Let N be the number of ports to be visited along 
route R; thus, the number of trade markets is M = (N)*(N-1). Each trade market includes 
shippers demanding ship slots from NS number of ships available at each port. The total 
voyage cost per twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) per day, for carrying the containers with 
distinct voyage times (TS,M), includes ship operating, ship capital, bunker, container, terminal 
handling, maintenance and repair, cargo claims, and administration costs. These costs were 
obtained from the Stopford (1997),Chen and Zeng (2010) and are used for illustration. Figure 
1 illustrates a liner service network in an assumed port rotation of Busan-Osaka-Keelung-
Kaohsiung-Busan.Distances and voyage times, at a speed of 19 knots, obtained from 
http://www1.axsmarine.com.The demand for ship slots is stochastic and, thus, historical 
demand data were used, as practised by most of the shipping companies. Currently, freight 
rates (FRS,M) for each ship slot along the trade lanes are decided in conferences, and 
variations in bunker costs and frequent announcements of general rate increases (GRI) result 
in increased fluctuation in freight rates. In addition, liner conferences are typically 
anticompetitive. Thus, a pricing mechanism is required for determining freight rates and 
exchange price to allocate and share ship slots efficiently and maximize the profit for the 
shipping lines. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.3 Problem definition 
Determination of an efficient slot allocation (xS,M) and fleet deployment plan from NS number 
of ships provided by liner shipping companies along an assumed itinerary covering N number 
of ports to satisfy the demand (DM)  at M number of port pairs given: the available 
controllable capacities of the ships(CS), the total voyage cost for each ship (TVCS,M) that 
includes the ship operating, ship capital, bunker, container, terminal handling, maintenance 
and repair, cargo claims and administration costs, and the freight rate (FRS,M) for each ship 
and market. 
3.3.1 Mathematical model 
The mathematical model used for solving the slot allocation problem to maximise the profit 
(z) of each ship in trade markets, and to plan the deployment of different ship capacity along 
a cyclic route is as follows: 
Maximise 
 z = ƩS,M(FRS,M – TVCS,M)xS,M (1) 
Subject to 
 ƩM(xS,M) ≤ DCS∀	S (2) 
 ƩS(xS,M) ≤ DM∀	M (3) 
 xS,M ≥ 0  ∀	S and M (4) 
The available controllable capacity, CS varies as the ship is allocated with slots (xS,M) and 
passes through the ports. Therefore, it is represented by DCS, the dynamic capacity of each 
ship at each port and are calculated using the relation 
 DCS = CS – δS,M(xS,M) (5) 
 
where δS,M = 0 or 1 to indicate the allocation of slots at port. 
3.3.1.1 Assumptions of the mathematical model 
• The short sea shipping services with equal vessel speed and voyage time, and common 
ship route definition are considered to initiate the simulation process. 
• The terminal handling times of containers for all ships at all port terminals are considered 
equal. 
• Each container is assumed to be completely filled and considered as one TEU. 
• Slot purchases, and exchange agreements among shipping lines in secondary markets for 
transhipment are not considered to ease the complexity handled in mathematical model 
• Freight rates are decided only in liner conferences. 
3.3.2 Multi agent system model 
This sustainable decision model supports fleet deployment plan and efficiently allocate slots 
among the shippers and shipping companies under cooperative pricing and allocation 
mechanism. The model consists of two markets, primary market and secondary market. In 
Primary market, the ship slot provider such as liner shipping companies and carriers, and the 
slot demander that is shippers are designed as agents to interact through IES. And in 
secondary market, the shipping companies or carriers are treated as agents to trade the slot 
filled in primary market. This approach is explained as follows, 
3.3.2.1MAS model for primary market 
In this market, shippers as agents submit their demand for slot to the IES. These slots are 
bundled as per the assumptions made in MAS model by the slot providers and presented to 
IES. The IES collects the bid from the shippers for each bundle and works unbiased by using 
 
ICA to coordinate the agents in pricing (FRS,M) and allocation (SLS,M). The revenue for the 
liner shipping companies and VCG payments for each shipper are calculated based on the 
output from the IES. Figure 2 shows the MAS model for agents in primary market. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The profit earned by the slot provider in the primary market (PSHS,M) is given by 
PSHS,M  = ((SLS,M *FRS,M) -  (SLS,M * TVCS,M ))*TS,M∀shipping line agents and markets  (6) 
Similarly, the profit earned by all of the ships available in the market is determined, and the 
slot provider with maximal profit earned is selected.  
3.3.2.2 MAS model for secondary market 
The secondary market is designed with shipping lines as agents interacting with IES to sell or 
purchase slots at an exchange price determined using ICA mechanism. In this market, the 
shipping line that demand ship slots are treated as buyer and the neighbouring shipping lines 
that provides it are considered as seller agents This trade situation arises if the slots won by 
the shipping line is greater than the available dynamic capacity of the ship in the primary 
market, or the shipping lines are interested to exchange slots won in primary market.  Thus, 
the slots (yS,M) selected for auctioning based on this situation in the secondary market are 
bundled as per the assumptions in MAS model, and presented to IES. The IES request the 
bids from the liner shipping companies (seller) and the exchange price (EPS,M) for the 
allocated slots are determined. . Figure 3 shows the MAS model for secondary market. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 Insert Figure 3 here 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The profit (PSCS,M) earned using the MAS model after slot purchase (yS,M) by the buyer in 
each secondary market is obtained using the following equation: 
PSCS,M = ((EPS,M * yS,M ) – (yS,M * TVCS,M ))*TS,M  ∀ buyer shipping line agent and markets (7) 
The total profit earned by the buyer in the secondary market considering the profit earned in 
primary market is given by, 
z = PSHS,M – PSCS,M  (8) 
The total slots served by the buyer in the secondary market after deducting the slots won in the 
primary market is given by, 
xS,M = SLS,M – yS,M  (9) 
Similarly, the profit (PSCS,M) earned using the MAS model after slots(yS,M) sold by the sellers 
in each secondary trade market is given by, 
PSCS,M = ((yS,M* VCGS,M) - (TVCS,M * yS,M))*TS,M∀ seller shipping line agents and markets (10) 
The total profit (z) earned by the sellers in the secondary market considering the profit earned 
in primary market is given by, 
z = PSHS,M + PSCS,M           (11) 
and the total slots served by the seller shipping line agents considering slots in primary and 
secondary market is given by, 
 xS,M = SLS,M + yS,M          (12) 
The overall structure of the MAS and its interaction are presented in Figure 4. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 4 here 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
3.3.2.3 Assumptions in the MAS model 
• Slot purchase, slot exchange and transhipment of containers are considered.  
• The procedure for bundle formation are assumed as follows 
o ‘n’ blocks are assumed and formed from the demand of container ship slots 
(DS,M) in primary market, and slots selected for trade (yS,M) in the secondary 
market 
o ‘m’ identical bundles of size (n/m) are assumed to obtain bid requests for 2m 
bundle sets(BS) 
4. Solution methodology 
In this section, the steps followed for ship fleet deployment planning, slot allocation, and 
pricing by using the two solution methodologies are explained. Figures 5 and 6 present the 
methodologies using the flowcharts. 
 4.1 Method 1: CPLEX 12.5 solver in AIMMS software 
The steps followed to solve the ship fleet deployment planning, slot allocation, and pricing 
problems are  
Step1: Input the data, such as freight rate, voyage time, total voyage cost per TEU per 
day, ships and route, capacity, and the ports along the route. 
Step2:  Calculate the number of trade markets, total voyage cost and determine the 
position of each ship. 
Step3:  Determine the ship available capacity in each trade market of the port. 
Step4:  If the ships are not available at the port because of a draft condition, set the 
capacity of ships = 0; otherwise, 
Step5: If ships are at the start position in port rotation, set the available capacity of 
ships = total capacity, and input the demand data for the trade markets at port, 
then proceed to Step7; otherwise, 
Step6:  Set the capacity of ships at initial full capacity minus the transit slots allocated 
at the previous ports for containers to be transported for more than one sailing 
leg, and input demand data for the trade markets at that port. 
Step7:   Solve the slot allocation problem by using the CPLEX 12.5 solver in AIMMS 
software. 
Step8:  Add the port of visit for the ship to obtain ship route based on slot allocation in 
Step7. 
Step9:   Calculate the profit (z) of each ship. 
 Step10: If the port is the end port in the ship itinerary, proceed to Step 
11;otherwise,move to the next port and return to Step 4. 
Step11:  Obtain the ship route, slot allocation, and profit at all trade markets and ships. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 5 here 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
4.2 Method 2: Iterative Combinatorial Auction 
The steps followed for solving the slot allocation and pricing problem using an ICA are as 
follows: 
Step1: Input the data, such as voyage time, total voyage cost per TEU per day, ships 
and route, initial ship full capacity, and the ports to be visited along the route. 
Step2: Calculate the numbers of trade markets, total voyage cost, and determine the 
position of each ship. 
Step3:   Input demand for the trade markets at that port and form a bundle of slots. 
Step4:  Determine the agents as shipping lines/carriers and shippers available at the 
trade markets of the port. 
Step5:  Run slot allocation and pricing function for each trade market to select the 
shipping line agent(seller) with maximal profit (PSHS,M) and allocate ship 
 slots(SLS,M) to the shippers(buyers) in the primary market. The steps followed 
at auction are as follows: 
Step5.1:  Collect bids for the bundle sets from buyers by using the IES. 
Step5.2:  Initiate the ICA algorithm (Appendices A: Iterative 
Combinatorial Auction (ICA) and Appendices A.1: Winner Determination 
Problem(WDP) solution procedure) 
Step6: If the demand for slots to be provided by the selected seller agent in the 
primary market is higher than the capacity available at the ship or if shipping 
line agents are interested in selling or purchasing ship slots, calculate the 
number of slots to be traded in the secondary market (yS,M), and proceed to 
Step7; otherwise, proceed to Step 8. 
Step7:  Run slot allocation (yS,M) and pricing function for the secondary trade market to 
determine the allocation and profit (PSCS,M)for the buyer shipping line agent 
and the seller shipping line agents. The steps followed at auction are as follows: 
Step7.1:  Collect bids for the bundle sets from sellers by using the IES. 
Step7.2:  Initiate the ICA algorithm. 
Step8:  If all trade markets at the port are allocated, proceed to Step9; otherwise, move 
to the next trade market and return to Step3. 
Step9:  If all ports on the assumed itinerary are visited and fulfilled, proceed to Step10; 
otherwise, move to the next port and return to Step3. 
 Step10:  Obtain the choice of ship, its route, allocation (xS,M), profit(z), and agent 
payments at each market. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 6 here 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
The solution methodologies are illustrated in the next section. 
5. Numerical explanation 
Table 1 presents input data applicable for both methodologies. The assumed cyclic ship route 
to be served by the ships deployed is shown in Figure 7. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 7 and Table 1 here 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Method 1: CPLEX 12.5 solver in AIMMS software 
The number of ports to be visited along the considered route was 4, and thus, the number of 
trade markets was 12. The demand data and ship capacity are entered, and the output solutions 
from the AIMMS software are obtained. 
5.1.1 Ship position – Busan (A) 
At port A, the trade markets were A-B, A-C, and A-D, and the ship capacity was equal to total 
capacity. The demand for slots was entered, and the outputs obtained from the AIMMS 
software are shown in Figure8. 
 ________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 8 here 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1.2 Ship position – Osaka (B) 
The ship reached Osaka, and the trade markets at port B were B-C, B-D, and B-A port pairs. 
The dynamic capacity was calculated at Port B by deducting the transit slots from the initial 
full capacity of the ship if the slots were allocated for trade markets A-C and A-D at port A. 
The demand for slots was entered, and the outputs obtained from the AIMMS software are 
shown in Figure9. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 9here 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1.3 Ship Position – Keelung(C) 
The ship reached Keelung, and the trade markets at port C were C-D, C-A, and C-B. The 
dynamic capacity was calculated at Port C by deducting the transit slots from the initial full 
capacity of the ship if the slots were allocated for trade markets A-D at port A, and B-D, B-A 
at port B. The demand for slots was entered, and the outputs obtained from the AIMMS 
software are shown in Figure10. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 10here 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 5.1.4 Ship position – Kaohsiung (D) 
The ship reached Kaohsiung, and the trade markets at port D were D-A, D-B, and D-C. The 
dynamic capacity was calculated at Port D by deducting the transit slots from the initial full 
capacity of the ship if the slots were allocated for trade markets B-A at port B, and C-A, C-B 
at port C. The demand for slots was entered, and the outputs obtained from the AIMMS 
software are shown in Figure11. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 11here 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
5.2 Method 2: Iterative Combinatorial Auction 
The slot allocation and pricing in the primary and secondary markets to maximise the profit 
for each ship on the considered route are presented in this section. The demand for slots by the 
shippers (buyers) was bundled in the primary market by the shipping line agents, and the bids 
were requested for each bundled sets through IES, as shown in Tables2 and 3. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Tables 2 & 3 here 
 
5.2.1 Ship position –Keelung (C) 
For illustration, the ships were considered to be positioned at Keelung(C), and the trade 
market C-A was used to explain the proposed methodology. 
 5.2.1.1 Primary market C-A 
The demand for slots for the sailing leg C-A was bundled for auction to the shippers by all the 
shipping lines available at Port C. The profit earned by the shipping line agents (PSHS,M)and 
VCG payment received by shippers in the primary market for the slot allocation (SLS,M) were 
calculated, and the results are presented in Table4.  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 4 here 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
The shipping line agent with maximal profit was considered as the winner in the primary 
market, and the available number of slots to be provided by the ship was checked. If the 
available number of slots was less than the slots demanded by the shippers or if the shipping 
line agent was willing to trade the slots, the secondary market was initiated. In this illustration, 
the winner was Ship4, and the secondary market was initiated as the available number of ship 
slots were less than the slots demanded by the shippers 
5.2.1.2 Secondary market at C-A 
The slots (yS,M) decided by the shipping line agent won in the primary market were bundled 
and the bids were requested through IES from the neighbouring shipping line agents in 
secondary market. The profit earned by the shipping line agent (buyer) in the secondary 
market (PSCS,M), slot allocation ((yS,M), VCG payment for seller shipping line agents, and total 
profit (z) earned by the buyer and seller shipping line agents were calculated, and the results 
are presented in Table5. 
	  
 __________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 5 here 
________________________________________________________________________________________
 
Figure 12 shows a screenshot of the software output obtained using the ICA for Ship 4 in the 
primary trade market C-A. Similarly, the experiment was performed for all the ports and their 
trade markets to satisfy the demand along the trade route.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 12 here 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Results and comparison 
The results obtained using the two solution procedures are presented and compared in this 
section. 
6.1 Method 1: CPLEX 12.5 solver in AIMMS software 
The overall profit earned by the ships at each trade market based on the allocation of slots by 
using the CPLEX 12.5 solver in AIMMS are presented in Table6. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 6 here 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Based on the slot allocation, the ship size and their route were determined to transport 
containers at a low cost between port pairs. The route determined for each ship is shown in 
Table7. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 7 here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6.2 Method 2: Iterative Combinatorial Auction 
The proposed methodology to achieve cooperation among shippers, and alliance members in 
determining the slot price (FRS,M) and exchange price (EPS,M) was solved, and the results are 
presented in Tables 8 to 11 for comparison. 
6.2.1 Primary trade market 
Table 8 presents the outputs obtained in the primary markets. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 8 here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.2.2 Secondary market 
 
Table 9 presents the outputs obtained in secondary markets along with the exchange price. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 9here 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 The total profit earned at each port pair (z) and the total slots served by each ship are presented 
in Table10. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 10 here 
______________________________________________________________________________________
Based on the slot allocation, the ships of each shipping line and their route were determined to 
transport containers at a low cost between port pairs considering the shippers involvement in 
pricing of slots, and cooperation among market players. Table 11 presents the route 
determined for each ship. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 11 here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The results revealed that the ICA consider the social interest of market players to determine 
the slot allocation among agents at maximal profit in complex, dynamic, and competitive 
environment when compared with the mathematical models adopted by shipping companies. 
However, the losses incurred depend on the decision of the shipping line agent to initiate the 
secondary market as well as the bid values submitted for each trade markets. Also the 
proposed ICA mechanism requires [(2 (BS-1) * NB) * (M), where BS = 2N], number of iterations to 
solve the allocation and pricing problem. As complete logical search enumeration of WDP in 
ICA was done, the computational time was reasonably more, and it depends on the skill, bid 
distribution and learning ability of the bidders in auction. 
 7. Conclusion and future research 
This study investigated the ship deployment and route planning problem to maximise profit 
earned by shipping line agents, and to match the demand and supply for ship slots. In this 
study, the slot allocation and the pricing problem in the liner shipping industry was solved 
using ICA among agents, and the slots were allocated to shippers and alliance members by 
exchanging information using an unbiased IES. The MAS with ICA solution methodology 
was compared with the mathematical model of the prevailing practices of liner shipping 
industry solved using the CPLEX 12.5 solver in AIMMS software. The results obtained from 
the MAS model with ICA solution method shows increased profit for shipping companies, 
flexible freight rates along various ship routes, more involvement of shippers, and improved 
service quality for the shared slots between the shipping companies. This study also 
contributes by coupling MAS with an ICA mechanism to involve more market players, and 
enhance the competitiveness with sustainable resource allocation and alliance formation. Also, 
the freight rate determined in ICA with VCG payment provides economically efficient 
allocation with social benefits to the bidders in the dynamic and uncertain liner shipping trade 
market. Although the relevant information and data for the simulation were obtained from the 
previous studies, the proposed MAS with ICA methodology must be validated before 
implementation. In addition, the requirements for a suitable method for bundling ship slots, an 
algorithm to reduce computational time for solving winner determination problem in ICA, and 
a method for training agents to value the non homogeneous and complement bundles provide 
scope for future research.  
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 Appendix A: Iterative Combinatorial Auction (ICA) 
The ICA algorithm is explained as follows 
Step1:   The buyers (NB) are allowed to bid (BV(NB,BS))bundled sets of the seller 
Step2:   Iteration count in auction is set from 0 to large value 
Step3:  If Iteration value is zero, set auction value for all buyers and bundle sets 
(AV(NB,BS)) as zero, run WDP including all buyers using their bid value in 
Step1 and determine an initial allocation (AL(NB,BS)) 
Step4:  Update the array of buyers (bidders) with one if allocated and zero if the buyers 
are not allocated 
Step5:  The auction values are incremented for each buyer without allocation in the 
previous iteration if 
  Step5.1: The bid value is not equal to zero and 
  Step5.2: The bundle set having maximum bid value for each buyer and 
Step5.3: The auction value of the bundle set with maximum bid value is equal 
to bid value of any other bundled set of same buyer and 
  Step5.4: The auction value is less than bid value for the corresponding bid set 
Step6:  Run WDP with all buyers and excluding one buyer for (NB + 1) times and 
calculate the revenue of seller in (NB + 1) markets by adding the auction values 
for the allocated bundle sets and go to step4, else 
Step7:  If auction value is equal to bid value for any buyer and for any bundle sets, Run 
WDP with all buyers and exclude one buyer for (NB + 1) times and calculate 
 the revenue of seller (NB + 1) markets by adding the auction values for the 
allocated bundle sets 
Step8:   Store the allocation as final allocation (AL(NB,BS)) of bundle sets to the buyers 
Step 9: Calculate the maximum auction value (Competitive Equilibrium price) 
considering all buyers in the market and store the bundle set and buyer 
containing the maximum auction value 
Step10:  Increment the auction value if 
  Step10.1: The buyer is not the buyer containing maximum auction value 
Step10.2: The maximum bid value for the buyer for the bundle sets is greater 
than the maximum auction value from step9 
Step10.3: Run WDP with all buyers and by excluding one buyer for (NB + 1) 
times 
Step11:  Calculate the seller revenue for the final allocation as in step8 using the auction 
value in step10 for (NB + 1) markets 
Step12:  else if  
Step12.1: The buyer is not the buyer with maximum auction value found in 
step9 and  
Step12.2: The auction value of any other buyer is equal to maximum auction 
value as in step9 
Step13: Run WDP with all buyers and exclude one buyer for (NB + 1) times 
 Step14:  Calculate the seller revenue for the final allocation in step8 using the auction 
value in step12 for (NB + 1) market and the Universal Competitive Equilibrium 
(UCE) price is reached, stop iteration 
Step15:  Calculate buyer’s VCG payment using the equation 
Buyer’s VCG Payment = {(Sum of auction value of allocated set of slots to the 
buyer) – [(Seller revenue in market of all buyers ( )) – (Seller revenue in 
market without the buyer to whom the payment is calculated ( ))]} 
Step16:  Output the final allocation, seller revenue in all markets, VCG payments of all 
buyers 
A.1. Winner Determination Problem(WDP) solution procedure 
The algorithm to solve WDP by the seller is given below 
Step1:  Input number of bundles (m), number of buyers (NB) 
Step2:  Calculate the BS = 2m number of combinations, with each combination that 
contains the set of bundles 
Step3:  Obtain auction value for all the bundle sets in which the buyers are interested 
Step4:  Calculate the summation of auction value for 2(BS)*(NB) allocations checking for 
the non-repetition of bundles and sets.  
Step5:   Count the number of winners in each allocation 
Step6:  Choose the allocation with maximum summation of auction value and more 
number of winners 
 Annexure 1: List of Notation 
Symbol Description 
S Set containing different types of ship 
CS Ship capacity 
R Ship itinerary 
P List of ports on assumed ship route (R).  
O Port of origin in each trade market 
D Port of destination in each trade market 
M Set of trade markets 
TS,M Voyage Time between each O-D 
TVCS,M Total Voyage Cost per TEU per day for each ship and market 
N Number of ports  
NS Number of ships  
DM Demand data of slots at each trade market  
FRS,M Freight rate per TEU per day for trade market  
δS,M 0 or 1, indicates the transit slots  
xS,M slot allocation for distribution/shipment by each ship at markets 
EPS,M Exchange price in slot exchange market 
PSHS,M The profit earned by ship in shipper’s trade market for MAS model 
z The total profit earned using mathematical and MAS model by ships 
 n Number of blocks with each block size  as DM /n 
m Number of bundles with bundle size (n/m) 
BS Number of bundled sets  
NB Number of buyers 
NB-i Group of buyers excluding ith buyer 
BV(NB,BS) Bid value by buyers for bundled sets 
AV(NB,BS) Auction value by buyers for sets 
SLS,M Slot allocation to shippers in primary market 
yS,M Slots for auction in secondary market 
 Seller revenue in market including all buyers that is main economy 
 Seller revenue in market without the buyer i to whom the payment is calculated 
(Marginal economy) 
AL(NB,BS) Buyers allocation in ICA 
PSCS,M Profit earned by the buyer and seller agents in secondary market 
 
	  
  
Fig. 1. Liner ship service network assumed in numerical illustration for all liners. 
 
 
Fig. 2. MAS Model for primary market. 
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Fig. 3. MAS model for secondary market. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Overall MAS structure to liner shipping logistics system. 
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Fig. 5. Flowchart for method 1 – AIMMS software. 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Start 
FR/TEU, TVC/TEU/day, ships its 
itinerary & capacity with ports 
Calculate trade markets, Total Voyage Cost and set port position of ship 
Enter the available ships and its capacity in trade markets 
If ship is not 
available Set capacity of ship = 0 
If start port in 
ships itinerary 
Set capacity of ship = Initial 
ship capacity 
Set capacity of ships = Initial capacity – Transit slots occupied 
Input demand for each trade market at the port 
If ship slot 
is allocated  
Add port and update the ship route for each ship 
If end port in 
ships itinerary 
Output the choice of ship, its route, 
allocation (xS,M) and profit(z) 
Stop 
Next port 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Flowchart for method 2 using iterative combinatorial auction. 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Start 
FR/TEU, TVC/TEU/day, ships with its itinerary, capacity 
Calculate number of trade markets, Total Voyage Cost and set port position of ship 
Input demand of slots for the trade market at that port, Form number 
of blocks, bundles and bid values for the sets of bundles 
Enter the ships, shippers available at the trade market of the port 
Run ICA and choose the ship agent (seller) with maximum profit (PSHS,M) and make 
allocation(SLS,M) of ship slots to the shippers (buyers) by receiving VCG payments 
[Shippers market] 
(Available slots in the ship < slots 
demanded by shippers) or shipping 
line agent willing to purchase slots 
Run ICA and choose the ship agents (Sellers) and buy ship slots by paying VCG 
payments [Secondary market] and determine profit (PSCS,M)  
Calculate purchase of slot by the buyer agent(yS,M) = Decided slots for secondary market, Form number of 
blocks, bundles and bid values for sets of bundles using purchase requirement 
If all trade markets at 
the port is allocated 
If all ports on the 
itinerary is visited 
and fulfilled 
Output the choice of ship, its route, allocation (xS,M), 
profit(z) and agents payments at each market and port 
Stop 
Next Trade 
market 
Next port 
  
Fig. 7. The cyclic ship route considered for illustration. 
 
 
Fig. 8. AIMMS output for ship position at Busan. 
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Fig. 9. AIMMS output for ship position at Osaka. 
	  
  
 
Fig. 10. AIMMS output for ship position at Keelung. 
	  
  
 
Fig. 11. AIMMS output for ship position at Kaohsiung. 
	  
  
 
Fig. 12. The screen shot of the V C++ software output obtained using ICA. 
	  
 Table 1: Input data for illustration 
Name of Ports Busan – A Osaka – B KeeLung - C Kaohsiung – D 
Minimum Draft in m 12.45 12 15.5 15 
Markets (Loaded(o) – unloaded(d)) A-B A-C A-D B-A B-C B-D C-A C-B C-D D-A D-B D-C 
Distance(1nm= 1.852km) 
Nm 352 1283 1525 2073 931 1173 1142 1494 242 900 1252 2183 
Km 652 2376 2824 3839 1724 2172 2115 2767 448 1667 2319 4043 
Days of travel at 19 knots 0.77 2.81 3.34 4.54 2.04 2.57 2.50 3.27 0.53 1.97 2.74 4.78 
Handling time in days 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Total Voyage time(T) in days 1.02 3.06 3.59 4.79 2.29 2.82 2.75 3.52 0.78 2.22 2.99 5.03 
TVC/TEU/day * T in 
dollars 
Ship1 – 1200 TEU 630 1891 2219 2960 1415 1743 1700 2175 482 1372 1848 3109 
Ship2 – 2500 TEU 597 1790 2100 2802 1340 1650 1609 2059 456 1299 1749 2943 
Ship3 – 4000 TEU 579 1738 2039 2721 1301 1602 1562 1999 443 1261 1698 2857 
Ship4 – 4000 TEU 579 1738 2039 2721 1301 1602 1562 1999 443 1261 1698 2857 
Freight Rate/TEUin dollars 470 500 550 340 420 440 700 680 0 700 620 0 
Demand of ship slots at each leg (DM) 480 500 420 120 190 210 600 525 0 580 520 0 
Source: http://www1.axsmarine.com, New Zealand Shippers’ Council, August 2010, Book of Martin Stopford (1997),Chen and Zeng (2010) 
 
	  
 Table 2: Procedure to bundle ship slots 
Description 
Trade markets 
A-B A-C A-D B-A B-C B-D C-A C-B C-D D-A D-B D-C 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Demand of slots 480 500 420 120 190 210 600 525 - 580 520 - 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Number of blocks (n) [1 block = DM/n] 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Number of bundles (m) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Bundle size (n/m) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Number of bundle sets (2m) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Set {0} in TEU - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Set {1} in TEU 240 250 210 60 95 105 300 262 - 290 260 - 
Set {2} in TEU 240 250 210 60 95 105 300 263 - 290 260 - 
Set {1,2} in TEU 480 500 420 120 190 210 600 525 - 580 520 - 
 
	  
 Table 3: Bid values for bundles in each market. 
Ships Shippers Bundles 
Bid values in US dollars  for bundles in each market 
A-B A-C A-D B-A B-C B-D C-A C-B C-D D-A D-B D-C 
1 
3 
{1} 475 500 550 350 425 450 700 675 - 700 625 - 
{2} 525 550 625 425 525 500 775 700 - 800 750 - 
{1,2} 800 850 975 675 750 775 1200 980 - 1250 1050 - 
2 
{1} 492 525 601 395 501 499 746 683 - 764 671 - 
{2} 599 673 831 504 714 619 1031 744 - 1055 851 - 
{1,2} 1037 854 1185 1081 873 886 1249 1182 - 1250 1179 - 
1 
{1} 596 577 778 414 692 571 793 732 - 995 760 - 
{2} 702 763 1126 706 721 764 1148 993 - 1222 923 - 
{1,2} 1090 1185 1203 1221 1143 1144 1250 1244 - 1250 1183 - 
2 
3 
{1} 475 500 550 350 425 450 700 675 - 700 625 - 
{2} 525 550 625 425 525 500 775 700 - 800 750 - 
{1,2} 800 850 975 675 750 775 1200 980 - 1250 1050 - 
2 
{1} 480 535 597 418 457 464 771 681 - 728 714 - 
{2} 734 594 929 611 615 580 822 850 - 1118 1015 - 
{1,2} 1210 1099 1205 1189 868 801 1217 1183 - 1250 1107 - 
1 
{1} 567 539 917 512 490 538 807 775 - 1018 945 - 
{2} 1120 1098 1061 756 689 658 1174 1036 - 1129 1081 - 
{1,2} 1236 1112 1236 1203 1050 999 1235 1201 - 1250 1244 - 
3 
3 
{1} 475 500 550 350 425 450 700 675 - 700 625 - 
{2} 525 550 625 425 525 500 775 700 - 800 750 - 
{1,2} 800 850 975 675 750 775 1200 980 - 1250 1050 - 
2 
{1} 685 769 975 365 582 541 1085 847 - 1236 941 - 
{2} 636 637 887 543 745 545 1110 794 - 1130 876 - 
{1,2} 1026 1166 1199 1125 1037 1005 1164 1197 - 928 821 - 
1 
{1} 525 525 550 397 471 467 762 681 - 769 660 - 
{2} 770 596 962 639 722 772 882 928 - 1015 976 - 
{1,2} 950 873 1194 945 972 837 1218 1178 - 1058 946 - 
4 
3 
{1} 475 500 550 350 425 450 700 675 - 700 625 - 
{2} 525 550 625 425 525 500 775 700 - 800 750 - 
{1,2} 800 850 975 675 750 775 1200 980 - 1250 1050 - 
2 
{1} 517 519 616 399 428 474 719 696 - 710 692 - 
{2} 624 735 900 534 556 694 991 854 - 980 1039 - 
{1,2} 1103 1087 1169 1010 1219 793 1204 1009 - 1250 1196 - 
1 
{1} 515 544 606 371 514 461 707 695 - 761 654 - 
{2} 771 579 688 668 597 575 910 800 - 904 952 - 
{1,2} 1068 1248 919 939 1109 886 888 990 - 1145 887 - 
 
	  
 Table 4: Ship’s profit (PSHS,M), Shippers payment and slot allocation(SLS,M) at primary 
market C-A 
Ships Ship1 Ship2 Ship3 Ship4 
Ship  Profit in US dollars 960300.00 1014750.00 983400.00 1049400.00 
Shippers 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Slot Allocation to shippers - - 600 - - 600 600 - - 300 300  
VCG Payment by shippers in dollars - - 1200 - - 1200 1164 - - 719 485 - 
 
 Table 5: Slot allocation (yS,M) and profit (z) in secondary market C-A 
Purchaser of slots(yS,M) is Ship 4, Ship 4 allocation = 600, Ship 4 Profit(PSHS,M) = 1049400.00in dollars 
Sellers of slots Ship 1 Ship 2 Ship 3 
Slots sold by sellers (yS,M) - - 600 
Exchange price (EPS,M) in US dollars - - 650 
VCG payment for Seller Shipping line in US dollars - - 650 
Profit earned by seller shipping line (z) in dollars - - 135300 
Profit earned by buyer shipping line(z) in dollars - - 914100 
 
	  
 Table 6: Ship profit (z) and slot allocation (xS,M) using CPLEX 12.5 in AIMMS 
Trade markets Allocation(xS,M) Profit(z) in dollars 
Ship 1 Ship 2 Ship 3 Ship 4 Ship1 Ship 2 Ship 3 Ship 4 
A-B - - - 480 - - - 25440 
A-C - - - 500 - - - 125500 
A-D - - - 420 - - - 199080 
B-A - - - 120 - - - 35640 
B-C - - - 190 - - - 46550 
B-D - - - 210 - - - 63420 
C-A - - - 600 - - - 151800 
C-B - - - 525 - - - 207375 
C-D    -    0 
D-A - - - 580 - - - 169940 
D-B - - - 520 - - - 81120 
D-C - - - - - - - 0 
Overall Profit - - - 1105865 
 
	  
 Table 7: Ship selected with its route using CPLEX 12.5 in AIMMS 
Ships Ship1 Ship2 Ship3 Ship4 
Route - - - A-B-C-D-A 
 
	  
 Table 8: Ship profit (PSHS,M) and Slot allocation(SLS,M) in primary market 
Trade 
Markets Shippers 
Allocation and Payment Received by ship from shippers Ship 
Chosen with 
Max.Profit 
Allocation 
(SLS,M) 
Profit(PSHS,M) 
in dollars Ship1 Ship2 Ship3 Ship4 
A-B 1 - - - - - - - - 
Ship3 480 113587.20  
 2 - - - - 480 800 480 800 
 3 480 800 480 800 - - - - 
Ship’s profit 89107.20 105264.00 113587.20 113587.20 
A-C 1 - - - - - - - - 
Ship3 500 431460.00  
 2 - - - - - - 500 850 
 3 500 850 500 850 500 850 - - 
Ship’s profit 354960.00 405450.00 431460.00 431460.00 
A-D 1 - - - - - - - - 
Ship3 420 613674.60  
 2 420 850 420 975 - - - - 
 3 - - - - 420 975 420 920 
Ship’s profit 538284.60 0.00 613674.60 530745.60 
B-A 1 - - - - - - - - 
Ship3 120 61503.60  
 2 120 675 120 675 120 675 - - 
 3 - - - - - - 120 675 
Ship’s profit 32763.60 0.00 61503.60 61503.60 
B-C 1 - - - - - - - - 
Ship3 190 79188.20  
 2 - - - - - - - - 
 3 190 750 190 750 190 750 190 750 
Ship’s profit 57433.20 71791.50 79188.20 79188.20 
B-D 1 - - - - - - - - 
Ship3 210 122585.40  
 2 210 775 210 775 - - - - 
 3 - - - - 210 775 210 775 
Ship’s profit 92975.40 0.00 122585.40 122585.40 
C-A 1 - - - - 600 1164 300 719 
Ship4 600 1049400.00  
 2 - - - - - - 300 485 
 3 600 1200 600 1200 - - - - 
Ship’s profit 960300.00 1014750.00 983400.00 1049400.00 
C-B 1 - - - - - - - - 
Ship3 525 761376.00  
 2 - - - - 525 980 525 980 
 3 525 980 525 980 - - - - 
Ship’s profit 668976.00 729960.00 761376.00 761376.00 
C-D 1 - - - - - - - - 
- - -  2 - - - - - - - -  3 - - - -  - - - 
Ship’s profit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
D-A 1 - - - - - - 580 1145 
Ship2 580 856254.00  
 2 - - - - 290 929 - - 
 3 580 1250 580 1250 290 43 - - 
Ship’s profit 813763.20 856254.00 795736.80 742945.20 
D-B 1 - - - - 260 525 260 692 
Ship4 520 853585.20  
 2 - - - - 260 525  - 
 3 520 1050 520 1050 - - 260 425 
Ship’s profit 671673.60 722982.00 749413.60 853585.20 
D-C 1 - - - - - - - - 
- - - 
 2 - - - - - - - - 
 3 - - - -   - - 
Ship’s profit(PSHS,M) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
	  
 Table 9: Slots (yS,M) and their profit(PSCS,M) after slot chartering market 
Trade 
markets 
(M) 
Slots 
bought 
(yS,M) 
Buyers 
Buyer profit 
(PSCS,M)in 
dollars 
Sellers Bid values in US dollars Allocation 
Exchange 
price 
(EPS,M)in 
dollars 
VCG Payment 
for seller 
(VCGS.M) in US 
dollars 
Seller 
profit (z) 
in dollars 
C-A 600 Ship4 1353000 
Ship1 
{1} 570 
- - 
- 
- {2} 570 
{1,2} 690 
Ship2 
{1} 0 
- - 
- 
- {2} 0 
{1,2} 650 
Ship3 
{1} 0 
600 650 
650 
135300 {2} 0 
{1,2} 680 
D-A 580 Ship2 109446 
Ship1 
{1} 0 
- - 
- 
 {2} 0 
{1,2} 680 
Ship3 
{1} 585 
580 670 
670 
109446 {2} 605 
{1,2} 670 
Ship4 
{1} 0 
- - 
- 
 {2} 0 
{1,2} 685 
D-B 520 Ship4 213148 
Ship1 
{1} 570 
- - 
- 
 {2} 570 
{1,2} 670 
Ship2 
{1} 0 
- - 
- 
 {2} 0 
{1,2} 650 
Ship3 
{1} 0 
520 650 
650 
213148 {2} 0 
{1,2} 660 
 
	  
 Table 10: Profit earned by the ship agents (z) using ICA 
Trade markets 
Allocation(xS,M) Profit(z)in US dollars 
Ship1 Ship2 Ship3 Ship4 Ship1 Ship2 Ship3 Ship4 
A-B - - 480 - - - 113587.20 - 
A-C - - 500 - - - 431460.00 - 
A-D - - 420 - - - 613674.60 - 
B-A - - 120 - - - 61503.60 - 
B-C - - 190 - - - 79188.20 - 
B-D - - 210 - - - 122585.40 - 
C-A - - 600 - - - 914100 135300 
C-B - - 525 - - - 761376.00 - 
C-D - - - - - - - - 
D-A - - 580 - - 109446 746808 - 
D-B - - 520 - - - 640437 213148 
D-C - - - - - - - - 
Overall Profit(Z) - 109446 4484720.00 348448 
 
	  
 Table 11: Ship selection with its route using ICA 
Ships Ship1 Ship2 Ship3 Ship4 
Route - - A-B-C-D-A - 
 
 
